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of the City Court of Long Beach served Nassau County. Both
counties are within the second department. Although plaintiff
may have argued that the costs of living in Nassau and
Westchester, second department counties, were found to be
significantly higher than in Onondaga or Oneida, fourth
department counties, the costs of living in Long Beach was also
significantly lower than in White Plains. Thus, as in Mackston,
state and federal constitutional geographical distinctions are not
limited only between counties and appellate departments, but also
between the cities within the counties, as well as within the
appellate departments. Furthermore, even if the duties,
responsibilities, and caseloads among the city court judges in
both White Plains and Long Beach, as reasoned in Barth, were
shown to be comparable, a rational basis for geographically
disparate salaries may still be satisfied by demonstrating a
significant differential in population, and cost of living. 888
Therefore, even if the suit had been brought under the New York
State Constitution, it is likely that the outcome would have been
the same.
People v. Peart889
(decided October 12, 1993)

Defendant claimed that his right to equal protection, pursuant

to the State 8 90 and Federal 8 9 1 Constitutions, was violated because

888. See Edelstein v. Crosson, 187 A.D.2d 694, 590 N.Y.S.2d 277 (2d
Dep't 1992). In Edelstein, the plaintiffs, six County Court Judges from
Dutchess, Rockland, and Orange Counties, submitted evidence that
demonstrated the similarity between their caseloads and the caseloads of the
Westchester County Court Judges, while the defendants submitted evidence
that demonstrated that the population and the cost of living in Westchester
County were higher than in Dutchess, Rockland, and Orange Counties. Id. at
696, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 278. The court held that there was a rational basis for
the disparate salaries where the average home in Westchester was sold in late
1987 for $361,094 while in late 1987, an average home in Orange County sold
for $132,050. By contrast, in Rockland County the average home sold for
$185,000 in 1988, and in Dutchess County, for $149,270, in 1989. Id.
889. 197 A.D.2d 599, 602 N.Y.S.2d 424 (2d Dep't 1993).
890. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11 ("No person shall be denied the equal
protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof.").
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the prosecutor's use of its peremptory challenge was racially
discriminatory. 892 The Appellate Division, Second Department
held that the defendant's right to equal protection was violated
because the prosecutor failed to give a race-neutral explanation
for its use of its peremptory challenges. 893
On March 8, 1991, the defendant was convicted of "criminal
sale of a controlled substance in the third degree" and "criminal
possession of a controlled substance in the third degree." 894
During voir dire, the prosecutor peremptorily challenged the only
two black members on the venire panel. 895 The defendant
objected to the exclusion of these potential jurors as a violation of
Batson v. Kentucky. 896 The prosecutor explained that although
the potential juror was "neutral," she was not a "strong"
prosecution juror. 897 In addition, the prosecutor failed to point to
any facts in support of these feelings.898 The trial court
concluded that the prosecutor provided a race-neutral explanation
and thus, excluded the juror. 899 The defendant was subsequently
convicted of both charges and appealed. 900
The Appellate Division, Second Department found that the
defendant's right to equal protection had been violated, reasoning
that the prosecution failed to provide a race-neutral explanation
for its peremptory challenge. 901 The court noted that the
891. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No state shall... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
892. Peart, 197 A.D.2d at 599, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 424.
893. Id. at 600, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 425.

894. Id. at 599, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 424.
895. Id.

896. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). In Batson, the Supreme Court of the United
States held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution

prohibits the prosecution from using peremptory challenges for discriminatory
purposes. Id. at 96. Once the defendant establishes a prima facie case that the
prosecution's use of its peremptory challenges is discriminatory, the burden is
shifted to the prosecution to present a racially neutral explanation for its
challenges. Id. at 97.
897. Peart, 197 A.D.2d at 599, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 424.
898. Id.
899. Id. at 600, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 424.
900. Id. at 599, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 424.
901. Id. at 600, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 424.
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prosecution's proffered explanation does not have to rise to the
level required for a challenge for "cause."902 Nevertheless, the
prosecutor's burden requires more than a claim of good faith and
denial of a discriminatory purpose. 903 Furthermore, the court
stated that excluding black veniremen because of their race is
constitutionally forbidden. 9 0 4
In reaching its conclusion the court applied the "totality of the
circumstance test" and found that the prosecutor's explanation
that the excluded juror was "neutral," but not "strong" was not
supported by the facts and was thus a mere pretext. 905 To accept
902. Id. (finding that prosecutor's peremptory challenge was race-neutral
where prosecutor.explained that it was unclear that prospective jurors would be
able to listen and follow an interpreter) (citing People v. Hernandez, 75
N.Y.2d 350, 358, 552 N.E.2d 621, 624-25, 553 N.Y.S.2d 85, 88-89 (1990),
aff'd, 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991)).
903. Id. at 600, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 424-25 (citing People v. Boiling, 79
N.Y.2d 317, 591 N.E.2d 1136, 582 N.Y.S.2d 950 (1992)). In Boiling, one of
the defendants established a prima facie case of purposeful racial
discrimination in the prosecution's use of its peremptory challenges. 79
N.Y.2d at 325, 591 N.E.2d 1142, 582 N.Y.S.2d at 956. The defendant
established that the prosecution had made a disproportionate number of
challenges toward African-Americans, and that two of the jurors who were
excused had backgrounds in prosecution. Id. at 325, 591 N.E.2d at 1141, 582
N.Y.S.2d at 955. However, a second defendant did not establish a prima facie
case of discriminatory use of peremptory challenges where the prosecutor
exercised three of the four allowable challenges against African-Americans? Id.
at 325, 591 N.E.2d at 1142, 582 N.Y.S.2d at 956. See People v. Rodney, 192
A.D.2d.626, 626, 596 N.Y.S.2d 169, 170 (2d Dep't 1993) (finding that
prosecutor failed to offer race-neutral reasons for peremptory challenges where
such explanations were inconsistent with her seating of white jurors and where
she claimed that those challenged did not fit her prototype); People v. Dove,
172 A.D.2d 768, 769, 569 N.Y.S.2d 147, 148 (2d Dep't 1991) (finding that
prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges was racially discriminatory when he
was unable to give specific reasons for the challenges).
904. Peart, 197 A.D.2d at 600, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 425.
905. Id. One of the excluded panel members was a nurse's assistant who
had ties with law enforcement employees and who had previously served as a
juror in a federal case. Id. at 599, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 424. See People v.
Manuel, 182 A.D.2d 711, 711, 582 N.Y.S.2d 735, 737 (2d Dep't 1992)
(finding that the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges is discriminatory
where the explanation for exclusion of black veniremen is inconsistent with the
inclusion of white jurors); People v. Benson, 184 A.D.2d 517, 584 N.Y.S.2d
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this explanation as race-neutral, the court explained, would be
"to accept no reason at all."' 906 Therefore, the court held that the
prosecutor's use of the peremptory challenge was racially
907
motivated and thus ordered a new trial.
Both the New York state courts and the federal courts interpret
their respective Equal Protection Clauses as prohibiting the use of

peremptory challenges in racially discriminatory manners. 908
Therefore, in Peart, the defendants' equal protection rights
pursuant to both constitutions had been violated.
909
People v. Rodney
(decided April 12, 1993)

The defendant, a black man convicted of possession and sale of
a controlled substance, claimed that the State of New York
violated the Equal Protection Clause of both the State 91o and

Federal 9 11 Constitutions, by employing its peremptory challenges
188, (2d Dep't 1991) (finding that the prosecution's use of its peremptory
challenge was racially discriminatory where the explanation for the exclusion
was that a black crime victim did not see her perpetrator punished and that her
own experience could hinder her from finding that an identification could be
made).
906. Peart, 197 A.D.2d at 600, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 425.
907.. Id.
908. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986) (stating that purposeful
racial discrimination in picking a jury violated a defendants right to equal
protection that a "trial by jury is intended to secure"); People v. Bolling, 79
N.Y.2d 317, 320, 591 N.E.2d 1136, 1139, 582 N.Y.S.2d 950, 953 (1992)
(stating that a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges in a discriminatory
manner violates the Equal Protection Clause not only because it violates the
defendant's rights but it also harms the excluded jurors, and the public at
large).
909. 192 A.D.2d 626, 596 N.Y.S.2d 169 (2d Dep't 1993).
910. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11 ("No person shall be denied the equal
protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof.").
911. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Section 1 provides in pertinent part:
No state shall make or enforce any laws which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
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